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Abstract
We exploit exogenous variation in the price of connection fees to study the process
of adoption of for formal connection to the electric grid in northern El Salvador. This
variation, generated by randomly allocating discount vouchers among households, also
generated exogenous variation in the share of neighbors receiving a discount (“voucher
intensity”). We find that discount vouchers accelerated demand for formal connections,
especially among households with an informal connection at baseline. We provide
evidence that voucher intensity did not crowd out formal connections by facilitating
informal access to the grid. Finally, we show that the electric utility could increase its
customer base, revenue flows and profits by sharing part of the connection fee in the
early years of an electrification project.
JEL codes: O33, O13
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the determinants of adoption of electric grid, paying particular attention
to the main suspect, adoption costs, as well as to one of the principal drivers of adoption
in developing settings, spillover effects, which in our case arise as a combination of social
learning and imitation. We then use these findings to illustrate a model in which it is
profitable for the electric company to share part of the adoption costs with its potential
customers.
There is little empirical evidence on the determinants of electricity adoption in develop-
ing countries.1 Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) propose the lead determinants of technology
adoption to be learning, profitability, incomplete markets, and “behavioral” mechanisms. In
this paper we focus on the role of learning (in particular, social learning and imitation) and
profitability (through variation in costs). Besides cost, we study spillovers from neighbors’
adoption decisions, induced by the wealth of evidence generated by the literature on tech-
nology adoption in developing countries (e.g. Conley and Udry, 2010; Bandiera and Rasul,
2006; Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Dupas, 2010).2
To our knowledge, Bernard and Torero (2013), is the first empirical study on the adoption
of electric connections. Using a similar identification strategy as this study, they find that
the probability of connection increased among voucher recipients. In their study, households
also responded to the number of number of vouchers allocated to the household’s neighbors,
something they attribute to “preferences interactions” (Manski, 2000), also known as “band-
wagon effects”. The main difference between this study and Bernard and Torero (2013) is
that our study allows to trace out the dynamics of adoption by using multiple follow-up
surveys. This proves to be key in our findings: while high-discount vouchers had a larger
take-up than low-discount vouchers in the first follow-up, the effects even out starting on
the second follow-up survey. We also find some evidence of spillovers, but the significance of
the coefficients depends on the particular model. In addition, these coefficients are valid for
the saturation experienced in our study, and are not generalizable if the whole population
1See Woolf (1987) for a study of adoption in early twentieth century USA.
2Conley and Udry (2010) study technology adoption among Ghanaian pineapple farmers and show evi-
dence of a special type of social learning: Farmers will adopt based on the experiences of their unexpectedly
successful peers. In turn, Bandiera and Rasul (2006) study how adoption of sunflowers varied by the farmer’s
network structure, finding an inverted U-shaped relationship. Studies on adoption of health technologies also
show evidence of social learning. Kremer and Miguel (2007) in a follow-up to Miguel and Kremer (2004), find
that students who had contacts exposed to deworming pills were less likely to take the pill, mainly because
the students had learned about the externalities of getting dewormed. In a study on adoption of bednets,
Dupas (2010) also finds evidence of social learning: households that did not receive the initial subsidy were
more likely to purchase a bednet if they lived near other households that received favorable subsidies. The
same study shows that willingness to pay for a bednet was higher among subsidy recipients than in the
control group, evidence that households were also learning from their own experience.
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received vouchers.
Vouchers increase adoption through several potential mechanisms: reducing connection
costs, ameliorating credit constraints, providing incentives not to procrastinate, and increas-
ing information about the program. In section 4.3 we argue that in this case the most likely
mechanism is cost reduction.
Next, we draft a model showing that under some conditions the electric utility may profit
from a voucher-allocation policy, de facto sharing connection costs with its customers. The
rationale is that vouchers accelerate connection take-up, which increases revenues in the early
years of the electrification project. As usual, equilibrium is achieved when the marginal gain
of an increase in the subsidy offered equals the cost of subsidizing all clients, including those
that would have connected without a subsidy. Using data from our experiment, we show
that the utility firm would benefit from sharing part of the connection costs. Furthermore,
the utility would increase its revenues by sharing 20% of the connection cost, but not by
sharing 50%.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 drafts the theoretical background,
while section 3 details the econometric approach. In section 4 we analyze the results, describe
the population of adopters, and explore implications for infrastructure financing. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 The Household’s Adoption Decision
We start from a static model with the basic assumption that households adopt an electric
connection if the benefit bi is larger than the cost ci, subject to their budget constraint:
bi > ci (1)
Where
bi = f(Ai, Ei, X0i) (2)
ci = Vi + Fi (3)
Ai is the vector of electronic appliances the household expects to acquire once they get
on the grid.3 This is key in that electricity provides utility gains only through the use of
electronic appliances like light bulbs, television sets, refrigerators, and so on. Put it another
3Some households may already own, for instance, TV sets that are operated with car batteries.
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way, these appliances are complement goods to electricity. Ei is the electrification rate
around household i, to account of spillover effects as found in Bernard and Torero (2013).
These spillover effects may arise from social learning, if households learn of the benefits of the
appliances from their neighbors, or imitation, which could be a way of learning itself, or could
be a reflection of preferences interactions (“bandwagon effects” or households keeping up with
their neighbors, Manski, 2000). Finally, X0i is a vector of demographic characteristics that
may affect the benefits obtained from electrification (e.g. age composition, literacy, etc.).
On the other hand, the costs of electrifying a dwelling, once it is within reach of the grid,
are a composition of variable and fixed costs. Variable costs cover wiring, installation of light
bulbs and sockets, as well as potential upgrade in wall materials4. Fixed costs consist of, for
example, any fees households have to pay as part of the application process, plus costs in
time and effort in such process. We exploit the existence of such fees in our study setting
to experimentally vary the cost of connection faced by each household in our sample, de
facto creating exogenous variation in Fi. This exercise also creates exogenous variation in
F i, the connection cost faced by i
′s neighbors, which in turn generates exogenous variation
in Ei, the connection rate in household i’s vicinity. We examine the role of both sources of
variation to study adoption of grid connections.
Before we move forward, we consider other variables that may affect adoption of grid
connections and their interaction with Fi and Ei. Income is one of the most commonly cited
determinants of technology adoption. Richer households are more likely to adopt an electric
connection for two main reasons: first, the marginal disutility of paying Fi decreases with
income, and second, since richer households can expect to buy more electronic appliances that
are complement goods to grid connection, they can extract more utility from a connection.
However, the way changes in Fi and Ei interact with income is not straightforward. Let’s
start with Fi. There is an income threshold m1 above which Fi is trivial, so adoption rates
will be unaffected by changes in Fi if income mi is greater than this threshold. Similarly,
there is an income threshold m0 under which virtually any positive Fi is unaffordable. Hence
only households with incomes m0 < mi < m1 will respond to changes in Fi. Similarly, Ei
will affect households within an income range, but it is not expected to affect neither very
poor nor very rich households.
Second, we discuss the components of Vi. Wiring costs are an obvious component of
Vi, and depends on the number of connections, sockets, light bulbs; but importantly also
depends on the material on the walls. A dwelling cannot be electrified if its walls are made,
for example, of wood, grass, or metal sheets; only if it has materials like cement, brick or
adobe. Some households will need to upgrade their materials in order to pass the safety
4X% of households in our sample had “inadequate” walls, meaning...
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inspection, which is not a trivial investment5. Vi includes time and effort for paperwork,
hiring contractors and all activities related to getting the connection. If households exhibit
hyperbolic discounting, they can postpone technology adoption indefinitely (Duflo, Kremer,
and Robinson, 2011). To ameliorate this concern the validity of the discount had a time
limit after the date of issuance, thus providing a salient benefit of taking action before its
too late. Vi also includes the cost of solving any credit or liquidity constraints faced by the
household. If solving liquidity or credit constraints in t > 1 periods is cheaper than doing
so in one period, Vi falls with time, so the probability of adoption should increase as time
passes, up to its equilibrium level.6
Before the program started, households that wanted a connection had to pay for the grid
extension themselves, by paying the electric utility for posts, cables, etc. Although there
is no official data on the costs, these are presumably high. Once a household got a grid
connection, they could offer informal connections to their neighbors. Informal connections
consist of a series of cables connected to a (formally connected) neighbor’s outlet. This type
of connections usually is enough to operate reliably a couple of light bulbs and at most a
TV set. It can be argued that households with informal connections value electricity more
than those that remained off-grid, since they have gone through the trouble of getting these
connections in the first place. Additionally, most of these households already own some elec-
tronic appliances and thus have higher potential gains from adopting formal electricity than
those with no access at all. In the empirical setting we account for this type of connection
with an ordered choice model.
Two other factors that could affect adoption are characteristics of the household head
and property rights. In Barron and Torero (2014) we show that males and females obtain
different benefits from electrification, so we may expect them to behave differently. Females
have higher valuation for health and education, and have more to gain from refrigerators and
other kitchen appliances, while males have no such gains. Property rights may also affect the
decision to connect to the grid, as they have been shown to affect other types of investments.
If households lack property rights, they could be evicted and the investment would be lost. In
fact, electrification may increase the probability of eviction since it increases housing value.
5On the other hand, a strong desire to get electricity may act as a nudge for households to update their
construction materials. Now there is a salient benefit of upgrading. Before, there was no such benefit (despite
the actual benefit of upgrading may be high).
6The pass of time could also lead to reductions in the number of connections, since some households may
decide to drop (given e.g. unexpected prices), but this is not the case in our empirical setting.
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2.2 Implications for Infrastructure Financing
In this section we study the conditions under which the utility would benefit by sharing
connection costs with the beneficiaries, by increasing its client base early on in the project.
Note that the electric company is a natural monopolist that cannot set price, which is
determined by the regulator, or costs. However, we argue that the electric company could
increase its customer base by paying a fraction of the connection fee. This practice is not
uncommon, e.g. among mobile phone companies even in some developing countries, that
pay a fraction of the phone in exchange for a commitment of use.
Let household benefits from electrification be given by b, which follows some density
function f(b). In this model, households will connect if b > 0, and will not connect otherwise.
Profits are given by
Π =
N∑
i=1
Ti(x) (R(qi)qi − x)− CF (4)
N is the total number of households within reach of the grid, Ti = 1 if household i is
connected to the grid, 0 otherwise, R(qi) = p(qi) − c(qi) is the gross profit obtained from
household i (gross of fixed and connection costs), qi is the quantity of electricity consumed, x
is the part of the connection fee paid by the firm, and CF is the fixed cost of grid extension.
At each round households can be classified as follows: Always-Takers, Never-Takers,
and Compliers. Always-takers are households that would have connected even without the
discount. Next, Never-takers are households that would not connect even if they received the
discount. Finally, Compliers are households that would connect if and only if they receive
the discount.
Note that the status of a household as a complier, never-taker or always-taker, is con-
tingent on the period. In particular, a household may be a complier at round t and an
always-taker at round s > t. For instance, take a household that without the voucher would
have decided to connect in period 3, but with the voucher decides to connect in period 2.
This household is a complier in period 2, but an always-taker in period 3. Despite its not
possible to know which household is a complier, the size of the complier subpopulation is
given by the estimates of the β coefficients in the adoption equations (section 3.1).
Formally, x has and effect on the extensive margin (through new customers), as well as on
the intensive margin (more consumption by the existing customers). To simplify matters, we
assume the intensive margin to be zero. This simplifies the algebra at little cost in terms of
insights. This assumption is perhaps more appealing if we think of intertemporal extensions
to this model, where lifetime electricity consumption would vary little by receiving a $20 or
$50 discount on the connection fee.
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We set the equilibrium such that marginal cost equals the marginal revenue. Assuming
no effect on the intensive margin (i.e. that qi does not depend on x), this simplifies to:
N∑
i=1
∆Ti
∆α
(R(qi)qi − x)−
N∑
i=1
Ti = 0 (5)
Note that ∆Ti
∆α
can take only one of two values. It is zero for always takers and never takers,
and one for compliers.In this context, always-takers are households with b > 0, compliers
are households with −x > b > 0 and never-takers are households with b < −x.
∆Ti
∆α
=
{
1 if − x < b < 0
0 otherwise
(6)
To keep simplifying matters, assume that qi is constant among compliers. Thus,
R(qi)qi = Rq ∀ i∈ C (7)
With this, we can re-write (6) as follows7:
Rq
∫ 0
x
f(b)db = x
∫ 0
x
f(b)db+
∫ ∞
0
f(b)db (8)
Equation (8) means that the additional gains the utility obtains from each complier at
this new level of x must be enough to pay x to each of those compliers, plus the marginal
subsidy increase to each always-taker (those who would have decided to connect before
the incremental change in the subsidy). This confirms the initial insight that if compliers
generate enough gains to the utility to pay for the additional subsidy to the always-takers,
it is profitable for the utility to offer a strictly positive subsidy.
We show this in the case of normally distributed b. If b ∼ N(µ, σ), from (8) it can be
shown that: [
Φ
(
x∗ + µ
σ
)
− Φ
(µ
σ
)]
(Rq − x∗) = Φ
(µ
σ
)
(9)
, which implies that if Rq > x∗, then x∗ > 0.
In order to find an upper bound to x∗, note that the model discussed in section 3 implies
an inverse relationship between qi and x (Zilberman and Liu, 2011). Marginal consumers,
7We have omitted an intermediate step. To wit,
Rq ×N Pr
(
∆Ti
∆x
= 1
)
= x×N Pr
(
∆Ti
∆x
= 1
)
+ N Pr (Ti = 1)
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those who need a discount to connect, will consume less than the average consumer. The
larger the required discount, the smaller qi. Thus, there is a threshold value for x, call it xT ,
such that ∀x > xT
Rq
∫ 0
x
f(b)db < x
∫ 0
x
f(b)db+
∫ ∞
0
f(b)db (10)
This simple model can be the base of a dynamic optimization problem in which the firm
either subsidizes in the first period only or subsidizes at every period. In its current form it
shows some interesting insights. If the compliers can pay for themselves (Rq > x), then the
optimal discount is positive. To pin down the optimum discount, we would need to impose
some more structure on the problem. Since this paper is not about the optimal subsidy, we
leave this issue for future research.
There are many reasons why this type of arrangements may not be implemented widely.
The most obvious reason would be due to lack of knowledge of f(b). Next, it could also be
the case that the electric company may face the probability of default in payments. Note that
the simple model sketched in this can incorporate the probability of default by multiplying
the left hand side of (8) times the probability of payment. However, more sophisticated
modeling of the probability of default and its associated costs could provide more interesting
insights. Third, it is the case that someone has to come up with this solution, and it is
possible that the electric companies have not done so yet.
3 Empirical Approach
3.1 Standard Approach
Our main estimating equation is given by:
connit = β0 + β1Fi + β2Eit + β3Xi0 + λt + εit (11)
To include household fixed effects and still be able to estimate β1 we follow alternative
methodologies. (i) we create a post dummy that takes the value of 1 in periods 2 through
5, and interact and interact all the explanatory variables with post. (ii) we interact each
explanatory variable with the round fixed effects, thus allowing for different effects in different
periods without imposing a linear or quadratic trend. (iii) we interact the explanatory
variables with t and t2. To allow for non-linear effects of Fi on connection, we also replace
Fi by dummies corresponding to the $20 and $50 discounts.
Since Eit is endogenous, we employ two strategies to find its causal effect on connit. First,
we use the average fee among household i’s neighbors as an instrument for Eit. Second, we
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replace Eit by the share of eligible neighbors around household i that received a discount
voucher, s¯i. This estimation gives the “reduced form” coefficient.
We start with a deliberately simple approach to study electricity adoption, we start by
estimating:
connit = β Voucheri + γ
100V 0−100i + λ
100N0−100i + ω
′Xi0 +
4∑
t=2
νt + εi (12)
, where conni indicates whether household i has a formal connection in year t, Voucher
indicates whether the individual received a voucher, V 0−100i indicates the number of house-
holds that received a voucher within a 100 meter radius of household i, while N0−100i , the
total number of eligible households around 100 meter radius of household i. Xi0 are individ-
ual baseline characteristics. The νt are year fixed effects are included because the follow-up
period includes multiple years; we collected up to three yearly measurements per observation
in years 2 through 4 of the study. εi is the unobserved residual. As is usual in this approach,
the standard errors will be clustered at the level of treatment, i.e., the household level.
Note that including the share of connections as an explanatory variable for i’s decision
to connect would be inadequate, since the neighbors connection decision depend upon i’s
decision. Hence, we only present this “reduced form” type of results.
Next, we allow for different effects by size of the discount, by estimating:
connit = β20V 20i + β50V 50i + γ100V
0−100
i + λ100N
0−100
i + ω
′Xi0 +
4∑
t=2
νt + εit (13)
Third, we estimate the effect of the amount of the fee, as well as the average fee in the
neighborhood of household i. This imposes some structure in the regression, namely, that
costs affect connection rates linearly.
connit = β × feei + γ100 × fee0−100i + ω′Xi0 +
4∑
t=2
νt + εit (14)
The results from the above regressions will give the effects of discount vouchers on adop-
tion averaged over the three follow-up surveys. To analyze the dynamic effects, we interact
the right hand side variables with time dummies.
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3.2 Informal Connections
A second issue we need to take into account is the existence of informal connections. To take
into account the “essential heterogeneity” (Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2006) at baseline
between households with no connection and those with an informal connection, the above
equations could be run separately for households with an informal connection and for those
with no connection at baseline, or we could fully interact each variable in the right-hand-side
variable with a dummy for informal connection at baseline.
We study switching patterns between three connection types: no connection, informal
connection, formal connection. Reductions in F unequivocally increase the probability of
household i getting formal connection to the grid, but reductions in E generate two opposing
forces: on the one hand, imitation-type spillovers would increase the probability of getting a
formal connection, while on the other hand, the more neighbors of i are formally connected
to the grid, the easier it is for i to get an informal connection.
We study the probability of switching among different alternatives. For instance, we look
at the probability of a household switching from no electricity to formal electricity at some
point over the study period, ignoring households that had informal electricity at baseline.
We conduct similar analysis for the probability of switching from no electricity to informal
electricity, and from informal to formal. While this has the disadvantage of leaving aside
part of the sample, it provides robust insights without imposting structure to the model.
Alternatively, we exploit the natural ordering among these three types and estimate
and ordered probit model. In this setting formal connections (y=2) are the best type of
connection, followed by informal connections (y=1), and finally by no connection (y=0).
Ordered choice models start by assuming that households choose the connection type that
maximizes their utility level. Subjects will choose their connection type y depending on the
value of a latent, unobservable variable y∗, such that:
y∗ = βxi + εi (15)
, where xi is a vector of explanatory variables. Although y
∗ is unobservable, we observe
y, the subject’s choice:
y = 0 if y∗ ≤ α1 (16)
y = 1 if α1 < y
∗ ≤ α2 (17)
y = 2 if y∗ > α2 (18)
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, for some (estimable) cutoff parameters αi. If we assume that εi follows a normal
distribution, we get to the ordered probit model. In this model, the probability of choosing
each alternative is given by:
Pr(y = 0) = Φ(α1 − xiβ) (19)
Pr(y = 1) = Φ(α2 − xiβ)− Φ(α1 − xiβ) (20)
Pr(y = 2) = Φ(xiβ − α2) (21)
and the marginal effects are given by
∂ Pr(y = 0|xi)
∂xk
= −βkφ(α1 − xiβ) (22)
∂ Pr(y = 1|xi)
∂xk
= βk[φ(α1 − xiβ)− φ(α2 − xiβ)] (23)
∂ Pr(y = 2|xi)
∂xk
= βkφ(α2 − xiβ) (24)
, where P (y = j|xi), j = 0, 1, 2 denote the probability of choosing no connection, informal
connection, or formal connection, respectively. Further, note that the direction of the effect
of xk on P (y = 0|xi) and P (y = 2|xi) is given by the sign of βk, but this is not true for
P (y = 1|xi), since the effect depends on the sign of φ(α1−xiβ)−φ(α2−xiβ). Note that the
marginal effects for each observation depend on their particular xi, so they will vary between
observations. Thus the effect may be positive for some households and negative for others.
This flexibility is especially interesting for us, since it is theoretically ambiguous whether
spillovers will increase or decrease informal connections.
4 Results
Table 2 shows how changes in Fi and E, empirically measured by “voucher” and “s100”
affected connection rates. Column 1 pools the four follow-up surveys (survey rounds 2
through 5), showing that voucher recipients were on average 12 percentage points more
likely to get a formal connection in the post-baseline period. Second, there appear to be
important spillovers: a 10 percent increase in s100 increased the probability of connection by
1.3 percentage points. This indicates potentially large externalities, which analyze in greater
detail later. The results in column 2, which adds household fixed effects to the specification
in column 1, are identical, which clears any potential doubts on whether randomization
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worked in this relatively small sample.
In specifications equivalent to columns 1 and 2 adding s200, the coefficients are unchanged
and s200 turns out not significant (online appendix). For the sake of parsimony we don’t
include s200 in our main specifications, but we include such specifications in the online
appendix as robustness checks. Columns 3 and 4 replicate the first two columns interacting
voucher and s100 with round dummies, which allows exploring time patterns. Although the
differences are not statistically significant, the coefficients on voucher are larger in rounds 2
and 3, around 15 percentage points, than at rounds 4 and 5, around 10 percentage points.
This decline owes to the fact that the connection rate in the non-encouraged group started
catching up the encouraged group, as shown in Figure 1. The effect of s100 doesn’t appear
to have such a trend, which would indicate persistence in the externalities.
Table 2 analyzes take-up using a different explanatory variable: the inspection fee. The
variable takes the value of 1 if households had to pay $100, 0.80 if they received the 20%
discount and 0.50 if they received the 50% discount. In this specification, spillovers are
captured by the average fee paid by eligible neighbors in a 100m radius. Pooling together the
three follow-up surveys shows that a $10 reduction in the fee would increase the probability
of connection by 2 percentage points. Once again, including household fixed effects leaves
the point estimates unchanged.
Next, we go on to the dynamics. The coefficient on the inspection fee at round 2 is
-.32, significant at the 1% level. By round 3 the effect size decreases to -0.26, significant at
the 5%. The effect loses significance and approaches 0 in rounds 4 and 5 (-0.13 and -0.11,
respectively). This indicates that a lower fee increased adoption early on, but not later in
the process.
The average fee has significant effects on connection take-up, with a $10 reduction increas-
ing the probability of connection by 3.5 percentage points over the study period. Analyzing
the dynamics we see that the effects are significant in all rounds, fluctuating from .29 (round
2) and .45 (round 3) te. This suggests that peer effects did not decrease with time. In
column 5 we explore linear and quadratic time trends in the effects of fee and fee100. While
this specification imposes more structure than the previous, said structure is consistent with
the more flexible specifications in the previous columns.
Now we turn to analyze how E affected connections. As discussed in the main text, we
use s100 (or fee100) as an instrument for E. An additional connection within 100 meters
increases the probability of i’s connection by 10 percentage points (10.3-11.1, depending on
the exact specification), almost the same effect as household i itself receiving a voucher.
When expressed in percentage of eligible neighbors, we see that a 10 percentage point in-
crease in the share of eligible neighbors that connect to the grid increased the probability of
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connection by roughly 2 percentage points (1.9-2.2, depending o the specification).
The exclusion restriction in this case requires that the instrument affects connection
decision only through its effect on E. Lets think about it. It means that s100 altered E,
which in turn affected E. The exclusion restriction would be violated if, for instance, i’s
neighbors who received vouchers would encourage household i to connect by providing them
information about the connection process, making them aware of the electrification process,
etc. If household i did not receive a voucher and their neighbor did, we would expect
household i to refrain from connecting, maybe hoping to get a voucher at a later stage or
being upset for not having received said voucher. The information story is not strong either,
since grid electrification projects are easily visible by all in the community. If it were an
information story we would have the externalities declining with time. We see no such time
trend. On the contrary, we spillover effects are persistent across our study period.
4.1 Connection Choice
We now turn to the analysis of connection choice. As discussed previously, households in our
sample have the option of getting an informal connection, which in the analysis so far has
been counted as begin off the grid. We conduct two types of empirical approaches. First, we
look at the probability of switching between any pair of connection types (from no electricity
to formal, from informal to formal, from no electricity to informal8).
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the household switched at some point
during the study period, and 0 otherwise. The sample only includes households that had no
connection at baseline (i.e., it drops households with informal connection at baseline). This
reduces the sample size to 275 observations. Once we control for covariates, the effect of
voucher and s100 are not significant: households that did not have an informal connection did
not respond to vouchers. The coefficient on s100 is too large to reject positive externalities,
but it is not statistically significant. Columns (3) and (4) report the results of switching
from informal to formal connections. Both voucher and s100 result strongly significant in
this subsample. Among this group, voucher recipients are 15 percent more likely to switch to
a formal connection, and having 40% of eligible neighbors receiving a voucher (mean s100)
increased the probability of connection by 4 percentage points. Finally, columns (5) and
(6) show that vouchers did not affect the probability of switching from no connection to an
informal connection.
Next, we present the result of ordered probit estimation for connection choice. This
method imposes more structure in the analysis in two main ways. First, it exploits the
8There are just 16 cases of households switching from informal to off-grid and no cases of households
dropping their formal connections
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difference in quality, which close to reality since differences in reliability and other charac-
teristics make formal connections better than informal connections. Second, it requires to
impose the assumption that the disturbances term follows a normal distribution. Table 6
shows the main results of the model.
Figure 3 plots the modeled probabilities of each type of connection by round, according
to the ordered probit model. In panel (a) we estimate the probability of formal connection by
round and plotted the kernel densities, to give a better sense of the evolution of connection
rates. Each round the mean increases and the variance decreases. Panels (b) and (c) show
that the probabilities of having an informal connection or being off-grid, respectively, moved
in the opposite direction. Hence, informal connections don’t seem to be crowing out formal
connections. On the contrary, formal connections seem to be crowding out informal ones.
Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of discount vouchers on the probabilities of formal
(panel (a)) and informal (panel (b)) connections, from the ordered probit model in Table
5 column 2. In this plot the marginal effect for each household was estimated, given their
own characteristics. Panel (a) shows that the effect of receiving a voucher is concentrated
around 0.10 at around 2, and that it fades away in later rounds, as non-recipients catch up
in formal connection rates. The effect of receiving a voucher on the probability of having
an informal connection is initially disperse, with a mean of around 0 and a range of -0.02
to +0.20, meaning that it increased the probability of an informal connection among some
households by 2 percentage points and decreased it by 0.2 percentage points among others.
In rounds 3 and later, the effect is negative among almost all households, and concentrated
around -0.02. Plot (c) shows that voucher recipients were less likely to remain off-grid by
round 2, but then the effect got diffused, as non-recipients adopted some type of connection.
Now, turning to spillover effects, Figure 5 plots the relationship between s100 and con-
nection type. To obtain these figures, we estimated the model in Table 5, column 2, and
obtained predicted values by simulating different values of s100 while keeping each house-
hold’s observed characteristics. Both relationships are roughly linear, but the slope on the
probability of having a formal connection is positive, while the slope on the probability of
having an informa connection is negative. Panel (b) shows that the marginal effect of s100
on the probability of having a formal connection is positive but declines as s100 increases:
household i’s first connected neighbors have slightly higher influence on i’s decision to get
a formal grid connection, and while having more connections increases the probability of
formal connection, it does so at a decreasing rate. On the other hand, the marginal effect
of s100 on the probability of having an informal connection is small, negative, and fairly
constant across values of s100.
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4.2 Adopters
Next, we examine the characteristics on adopters to get better insights on who may be the
beneficiaries of a cost-sharing policy. These are just descriptive regressions and we claim no
causality, they provide insights on the characteristics of adopters. The dependent variable
takes the value of 1 if the voucher recipient connected at some point over the course of the
study and zero otherwise. This regression controls for subdistrict fixed effects.
Households with informal electricity at baseline were 18 percentage points more likely
to take up the voucher, as were households with property title (8 percentage points) and
households with floor other than dirt (10 percentage points). Households with more members
were also more likely to adopt. Material on the walls had no apparent relation with adoption.
Income is positively related to adoption, but the magnitude is economically small: a $1,000
increase in annual income is associated with a 1.4 increase in the probability of connection.
Aged, gender and literacy status of the household head had no apparent relation with voucher
take-up.
Clearly all the variables are related, but empirically, the main marker to identify house-
holds that will respond to vouchers is informal connections. Those households have gone
through the trouble of getting the connection from their neighbors, hang cables, etc., which
reveals they have higher valuation for electricity than the rest.
4.3 Mechanisms
Earlier we argued that vouchers increase adoption by reducing connection costs, ameliorating
credit constraints, providing incentives not to procrastinate, and increase information about
the program. In this section we analyze the empirical evidence to try to identify which of
these channels likely played a larger role.
It doesn’t seem like vouchers worked as commitment devices. If households needed in-
centives not to procrastinate, both type of vouchers should have similar effect at each round.
On average they do, but the timing is not consistent with this story: high discount vouchers
have a higher adoption rate than low-discount vouchers. It is easier for a household to come
up with $50 than $80 for the connection fee, so households in the latter group will need a
longer period to connect. In addition, the non-encouraged group had high connection rates
starting from the second round (50%), up to 80% by the third round. This is consistent with
vouchers reducing connection costs.
Although the survey did not include questions on information about the electrification
program, it seems unlikely that vouchers increased program awareness. Projects of this
type are easy to detect by households, since they require erecting posts and other types of
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construction work.The reimbursement provided by the discount vouchers could have been
used to pay the cost of a loan, thus lifting credit constraints. However, access to credit
(either formal or informal) did not increase among voucher recipients. This is not to say
that these households are not credit constrained, but that vouchers did not increase access
to credit markets.
4.4 Implications for Infrastructure Financing
Table 5 shows some calculations to simulate revenues per household under different subsidy
schemes in the initial years of the electrification program. First, we have the electrification
rate per year under each type of voucher, from Table 1. To get at the average revenues
perceived by the electric utility we use the average bills for households with a formal grid
connection. The average electric bill in round 2 was $8.32 per month, so the average house-
hold generated $99.84 of revenues per year.
Multiplying the connection rate times the average bill we find that the utility received
$49.92 per household in the area. If the firm shares 20% or 50% of the cost, the figures
are $60.90 and $66.92, respectively. To find the most profitable alternative we subtract the
connection costs that the company shared in each scenario. Note that the company pays $20
for all connections in round 2 and for the increase in connection rates in the future rounds.
With this, we can estimate revenues under each of the subsidy schemes. Although this
is not vital for the results, we assume a 5% interest rate to calculate the revenues in the
first three years of operation. If the company provides no subsidy, it would receive roughly
$180 per household in the first three years. Sharing 20% of the connection costs would bump
those revenues by 10%, up to $200 per household. On the other hand, the 50% of the cost
proves not profitable, since revenues would be $175, below the no-subsidy scenario.
If the electric utility were able to discriminate, a more profitable, but more controver-
sial, solution would likely be implemented. Remember that cost sharing is “repaid” via the
additional revenues extracted from the monthly bills of compliers. If the company could
identify a “high bill” group, it could target subsidies to these households and improve rev-
enues further. One such group is better off households. As we saw previously, households
above the median income responded to the vouchers, while poorer households did not. Also,
the average electric bill in the former group is double that of the latter: better-off households
spent on average $11.02 per month, while poorer households paid $5.22 for electricity. Since
richer households are morel likely to respond to the voucher and to “pay back” the subsidy
with higher consumption, profit maximization on the part of the utility requires offering
subsidies only to the high-consumption group. Table 6 shows that the profit-maximizing
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strategy requires the utility to offer 20% discounts to better-off households and no subsidy
to poor households.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies the role that connection costs and spillover effects play in the adoption of
formal electric connections. We observe voucher recipients connecting 1-2 years earlier than
the control group, but the control group catches up to them by the end of the study. Thus,
in our setting households respond to time-limited reimbursements by adopting earlier than
the counterfactual.
Second, spillover effects seem to play an important role in adoption, and their effects do
not reduce down with time. An additional connection within 100m of a household increases
the probability of that household connecting formally to the grid by 10 percentage points,
roughly the same increase generated by vouchers.
Third, we analyze the possibility that households adopt informal connections, by model-
ing the probability of switching between different alternatives and by estimating an ordered
choice model. The first strategy suggests that households with informal connections at base-
line were much more responsive to vouchers and spillover effects, while these variables did not
affect the adoption rates of households with no connection at baseline. The ordered choice
analysis shows that vouchers (allocated directly or to neighbors) increased the probability
of formal connections, and decreased the probability of adopting informal ones. This solves
any concern about informal connections crowding out formal ones.
Among our treatment group, households with informal electricity at baseline were more
likely to take-up the voucher, as well as households with property titles. Better-off households
(no drifter, higher income) were also more likely to take-up the voucher. Despite gender
differences in the benefits of electricity (see e.g. (Barron and Torero, 2014)), gender of the
household head was not correlated to voucher take-up. Similarly, other characteristics of the
household head like age or literacy status were uncorrelated with take-up.
Finally, we show that the electric utility can actually increase its revenues by providing
discount vouchers in a similar fashion as in this study, given that vouchers increase the
utility’s customer base and revenue flows. In our study, the “optimal” strategy consists
in paying $20 of the inspection fee. Since connection rates among low- and high-discount
voucher recipients are very similar.
17
References
Bandiera, Oriana and Imran Rasul. 2006. “Social networks and technology adoption in
northern mozambique*.” The Economic Journal 116 (514):869–902.
Barron, Manuel and Maximo Torero. 2014. “Household Electrification and Indoor Air Pol-
lution.” Mimeo .
Bernard, Tanguy and Maximo Torero. 2013. “Bandwagon Effects in Poor Communities
Experimental Evidence from a Rural Electrification Program in Ethiopia.” .
Conley, Timothy G and Christopher R Udry. 2010. “Learning about a new technology:
Pineapple in Ghana.” The American Economic Review :35–69.
Duflo, E, M Kremer, and J Robinson. 2011. “Nudging Farmers to Use Fertilizer: Theory
and.” The American Economic Review 101 (6):2350–90.
Dupas, Pascaline. 2010. “Short-run subsidies and long-run adoption of new health products:
evidence from a field experiment.” Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Foster, Andrew D and Mark R Rosenzweig. 2010. “Microeconomics of technology adoption.”
Annu. Rev. Econ. 2 (1):395–424.
Heckman, James J, Sergio Urzua, and Edward Vytlacil. 2006. “Understanding instrumental
variables in models with essential heterogeneity.” The Review of Economics and Statistics
88 (3):389–432.
Kremer, Michael and Edward Miguel. 2007. “The illusion of sustainability.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 122 (3):1007–1065.
Manski, Charles F. 2000. “Economic Analysis of Social Interactions.” The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 14 (3):pp. 115–136.
Miguel, Edward and Michael Kremer. 2004. “Worms: identifying impacts on education and
health in the presence of treatment externalities.” Econometrica 72 (1):159–217.
Woolf, Arthur G. 1987. “The Residential Adoption of Electricity in Early Twentieth-Century
America.” The Energy Journal 8 (2):19–30.
Zilberman, D. and J. Hsing-I Liu. 2011. On Consumption Indivisibilities, the Demand for
Durables, and Income Distribution, chap. 52. Dynamics, Games, and Science I, 785–809.
18
Figure 1. Connection Rates by Treatment Arm
Voucher
No voucher
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
19
Figure 2. Connection Rates by Treatment Arm
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Figure 3. Connection Type by Round (Ordered Probit)
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Figure 4. Effects of Voucher Allocation on Connection Type By Round (Ordered Probit)
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(c) Effect of Voucher on Pr(No Connection)
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Figure 5. Spillovers of Voucher Allocation (Ordered Probit)
(a) s100 and Connection Type
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Table 1A - Summary Statistics and Balance by Treatment Arm
Control 20% Diff: 50% Diff:
Group Discount C-20% Discount C-50%
Age of household head 49.20 50.80 -1.60 48.99 0.21
(1.47) (1.25) (1.92) (1.29) (1.96)
Household head is male 0.62 0.72 -0.10* 0.72 -0.10*
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Household size 4.19 4.65 -0.46* 4.82 -0.63**
(0.18) (0.19) (0.27) (0.18) (0.27)
Total dependency ratio 0.47 0.44 0.02 0.43 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Maximum schooling in the household 5.51 5.76 -0.26 5.76 -0.26
(0.33) (0.33) (0.47) (0.32) (0.47)
Schooling of the household head 1.90 2.03 -0.14 2.23 -0.33
(0.25) (0.25) (0.36) (0.26) (0.37)
Household head is literate 0.49 0.49 -0.00 0.52 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Income pc, 1000USD per year 0.55 0.52 0.03 0.57 -0.02
(0.12) (0.07) (0.13) (0.08) (0.14)
Monthly expenditure in kerosene 2.96 2.56 0.41 2.20 0.76
(0.39) (0.32) (0.50) (0.27) (0.46)
Monthly expenditure in propane 1.69 2.11 -0.42 1.78 -0.09
(0.25) (0.22) (0.33) (0.22) (0.33)
Monthly expenditure in candles 0.57 0.55 0.01 0.55 0.01
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13) (0.19)
Monhtly expenditure in car battery rchg 0.12 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.00
(0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Cooks with wood 0.76 0.73 0.04 0.73 0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Informal electricity 0.39 0.50 -0.11* 0.48 -0.09*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Agrees with the following statement
Electricity illuminates better than kerosene. 0.96 0.95 0.01 0.97 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Powering a TV is cheaper w/elect than battery. 0.79 0.74 0.05 0.81 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Cooking with electricity is not convenient 0.61 0.46 0.15*** 0.50 0.11*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Electricity is very expensive 0.54 0.43 0.10* 0.47 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
Woodsmoke generates respiratory problems 0.87 0.84 0.04 0.87 -0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Kerosene is not an expensive source of lighting 0.42 0.35 0.07 0.32 0.10*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05)
Kerosene is the best way to illuminate my household 0.28 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.08
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05)
Notes: Columns 1, 2, and 4 show the mean values for each of the treatment arms at baseline (standard errors
in parentheses). Column 3 and 5 report the difference in means between the control group and households
that received a 20% or 50% discount voucher, respectively (standard errors in parentheses). Significantly
different than zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
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Table 2 - Discount Vouchers and Connection to the Grid (LPM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connected Connected Connected Connected
Voucher x Post 0.120*** 0.120***
(0.041) (0.041)
Voucher x Round 2 0.134** 0.131**
(0.054) (0.053)
Voucher x Round 3 0.147*** 0.148***
(0.054) (0.054)
Voucher x Round 4 0.105** 0.109**
(0.046) (0.046)
Voucher x Round 5 0.095** 0.096**
(0.042) (0.043)
s100 x Post 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.037) (0.037)
s100 x Round 2 0.123** 0.126**
(0.054) (0.054)
s100 x Round 3 0.156*** 0.156***
(0.049) (0.049)
s100 x Round 4 0.109*** 0.107***
(0.041) (0.041)
s100 x Round 5 0.134*** 0.132***
(0.036) (0.036)
Household Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2269 2269 2269 2269
Number of Households 494 494 494 494
Mean Dep.Var. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
R-squared 0.45 0.63 0.45 0.63
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. “s100” is the
share of eligible neighbors within 100m that received a voucher. “s200” is the share of eligible neighbors
between 100-200m radius that received a voucher. Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported
in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source:
Household Electrification Survey
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Table 3 - Connection Fee and Connection to the Grid (LPM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connected Connected Connected Connected Connected
Fee x Post -0.203** -0.201**
(0.085) (0.085)
Fee x t -0.327***
(0.122)
Fee x t-squared 0.054***
(0.020)
Fee x Round 2 -0.324*** -0.314***
(0.115) (0.114)
Fee x Round 3 -0.260** -0.261**
(0.108) (0.108)
Fee x Round 4 -0.126 -0.128
(0.094) (0.094)
Fee x Round 5 -0.108 -0.106
(0.088) (0.088)
Fee100 x Post -0.348*** -0.349***
(0.099) (0.099)
Fee100 x t -0.400***
(0.146)
Fee100 x t-squared 0.055**
(0.024)
Fee100 x Round 2 -0.294** -0.303**
(0.144) (0.143)
Fee100 x Round 3 -0.450*** -0.447***
(0.127) (0.126)
Fee100 x Round 4 -0.297*** -0.296***
(0.108) (0.108)
Fee100 x Round 5 -0.352*** -0.349***
(0.097) (0.098)
Household Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Lin + Quad Time Trend No No No No Yes
Observations 2269 2269 2269 2269 2269
Number of Households 494 494 494 494 494
Mean Dep.Var. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
R-squared 0.44 0.62 0.44 0.63 0.62
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. “fee100” is the
average fee for households within 100m. “fee200” is the average fee for neighbors between 100-200m radius.
Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than zero
at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
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Table 4 - Connection to the Grid and Externalities (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Connected Connected Connected Connected Connected Connected
Voucher x Post 0.122*** 0.124***
(0.040) (0.040)
Fee x Post -0.191** -0.199**
(0.082) (0.084)
Fee x t -0.324*** -0.332***
(0.116) (0.117)
Fee x t-squared 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.019) (0.019)
E (percentage) 0.193*** 0.222*** 0.214***
(0.055) (0.058) (0.058)
E (number) 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.101***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030)
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256 2256
Number of Households 481 481 481 481 481 481
Mean Dep.Var. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. E denotes formal
electric connections within 100m of the household. Excluded instrument in columns (1) and (2) is s100; in
columns (3) and (4), fee100. Columns (2) and (4) control for the total number of eligible neighbors within
100m. Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than
zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
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Appendix - Connection to the Grid and Externalities (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connected Connected Connected Connected
Fee x t -0.324*** -0.332*** -0.322*** -0.329***
(0.116) (0.117) (0.116) (0.116)
Fee x t-squared 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
E (percentage) 0.214*** 0.214***
(0.058) (0.058)
E (number) 0.101*** 0.100***
(0.030) (0.030)
Lin + Quad Time Trend No No Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Observations 2256 2256 2256 2256
Number of Households 481 481 481 481
Mean Dep.Var. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. E denotes formal
electric connections within 100m of the household. Excluded instruments in all columns are fee100× t and
fee100× t2. Columns (2) and (4) control for the total number of eligible neighbors within 100m. Standard
errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90(∗),
95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
Table 5 - Switching (LPM)
None-Formal Informal-Formal None-Informal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Switched Switched Switched Switched Switched Switched
voucher 0.010 -0.031 0.253*** 0.154*** -0.049 0.031
(0.057) (0.067) (0.050) (0.059) (0.048) (0.061)
s100 0.147** 0.103 0.086* 0.111** -0.009 -0.056
(0.059) (0.065) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.059)
Baseline Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Subdistrict Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 275 265 264 259 275 265
Mean Dep.Var. 0.75 0.76 0.85 0.85 0.15 0.15
R-squared 0.02 0.29 0.12 0.40 0.00 0.16
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. E denotes formal
electric connections within 100m of the household. Excluded instrument in columns (1) and (2) is s100; in
columns (3) and (4), fee100. Columns (2) and (4) control for the total number of eligible neighbors within
100m. Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than
zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
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Table 6 - Multinomial Choice (Ordered Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connection Type Connection Type Connection Type Connection Type
type
voucher 0.248** 0.272**
(0.117) (0.125)
s100 0.498*** 0.501***
(0.130) (0.135)
Fee -0.435 -0.547*
(0.271) (0.281)
Fee100 -1.188*** -1.261***
(0.389) (0.406)
cut1
Constant -0.034 -0.273 -1.766*** -2.153***
(0.096) (0.330) (0.382) (0.511)
cut2
Constant 0.321*** 0.118 -1.416*** -1.766***
(0.100) (0.335) (0.375) (0.507)
Baseline Covariates No Yes No Yes
Observations 1767 1714 1767 1714
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. E denotes formal
electric connections within 100m of the household. Excluded instrument in columns (1) and (2) is fee100; in
columns (3) and (4), fee100. Columns (2) and (4) control for the total number of eligible neighbors within
100m. Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than
zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
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Table 7 - Characteristics of Adopters
(1) (2)
Voucher No Voucher
Age of household head -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Gender of household head -0.036 -0.047
(0.042) (0.042)
Literacy of household head 0.011 0.031
(0.042) (0.041)
Property title 0.082** 0.101***
(0.039) (0.039)
Household size 0.019** 0.028***
(0.008) (0.008)
Adequate wall materials 0.026 -0.082
(0.056) (0.051)
Dirt floor -0.104** -0.082*
(0.046) (0.046)
Wood for cooking -0.012 0.003
(0.051) (0.050)
Income (thousand USD) 0.014** 0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Informal connection at baseline 0.177*** 0.110**
(0.050) (0.045)
Constant 0.686*** 0.728***
(0.114) (0.112)
Subdistrict FE No Yes
Observations 349 349
Notes: Significantly different than zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household
Electrification Survey
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Appendix - Discount Vouchers and Connection to the Grid (LPM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Connected Connected Connected Connected
Voucher x Post 0.115*** 0.116***
(0.042) (0.042)
Voucher x Round 2 0.141*** 0.138**
(0.054) (0.054)
Voucher x Round 3 0.149*** 0.150***
(0.055) (0.055)
Voucher x Round 4 0.092* 0.096**
(0.047) (0.047)
Voucher x Round 5 0.080* 0.081*
(0.042) (0.043)
s100 x Post 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.037) (0.037)
s100 x Round 2 0.132** 0.136**
(0.055) (0.054)
s100 x Round 3 0.158*** 0.158***
(0.050) (0.049)
s100 x Round 4 0.101** 0.099**
(0.041) (0.041)
s100 x Round 5 0.122*** 0.121***
(0.036) (0.036)
s200 x Post 0.027 0.025
(0.035) (0.035)
s200 x Round 2 -0.039 -0.043
(0.054) (0.054)
s200 x Round 3 -0.010 -0.014
(0.048) (0.048)
s200 x Round 4 0.068* 0.066*
(0.038) (0.038)
s200 x Round 5 0.086*** 0.084**
(0.033) (0.033)
Household Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2269 2269 2269 2269
Number of Households 494 494 494 494
Mean Dep.Var. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
R-squared 0.45 0.63 0.45 0.63
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. “s100” is the
share of eligible neighbors within 100m that received a voucher. “s200” is the share of eligible neighbors
between 100-200m radius that received a voucher. Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported
in parentheses. Significantly different than zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source:
Household Electrification Survey
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Appendix- Connection Fee and Connection to the Grid (LPM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Connected Connected Connected Connected Connected
Fee x Post -0.185** -0.185**
(0.087) (0.087)
Fee x t -0.332***
(0.127)
Fee x t-squared 0.056***
(0.020)
Fee x Round 2 -0.330*** -0.323***
(0.117) (0.116)
Fee x Round 3 -0.256** -0.259**
(0.111) (0.111)
Fee x Round 4 -0.091 -0.093
(0.097) (0.097)
Fee x Round 5 -0.072 -0.071
(0.089) (0.089)
Fee100 x Post -0.334*** -0.336***
(0.100) (0.100)
Fee100 x t -0.407***
(0.146)
Fee100 x t-squared 0.057**
(0.024)
Fee100 x Round 2 -0.301** -0.313**
(0.145) (0.144)
Fee100 x Round 3 -0.448*** -0.448***
(0.128) (0.127)
Fee100 x Round 4 -0.275** -0.274**
(0.108) (0.108)
Fee100 x Round 5 -0.324*** -0.323***
(0.098) (0.098)
Fee200 x Post -0.115 -0.108
(0.090) (0.091)
Fee200 x t 0.034
(0.144)
Fee200 x t-squared -0.018
(0.024)
Fee200 x Round 2 0.032 0.046
(0.137) (0.137)
Fee200 x Round 3 -0.030 -0.019
(0.126) (0.126)
Fee200 x Round 4 -0.216** -0.214**
(0.096) (0.096)
Fee200 x Round 5 -0.237*** -0.233***
(0.087) (0.087)
Household Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Lin + Quad Time Trend No No No No Yes
Observations 2269 2269 2269 2269 2269
Number of Households 494 494 494 494 494
Mean Dep.Var. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56
R-squared 0.44 0.62 0.45 0.63 0.62
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. “fee100” is the
average fee for households within 100m. “fee200” is the average fee for neighbors between 100-200m radius.
Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than zero
at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
35
Table 5 - Switching (LPM)
None-Formal Informal-Formal None-Informal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Switched Switched Switched Switched Switched Switched
Fee 0.055 0.076 -0.365*** -0.122 0.085 -0.056
(0.127) (0.138) (0.106) (0.113) (0.105) (0.125)
Fee100 -0.261* -0.157 -0.392*** -0.360*** 0.021 0.088
(0.155) (0.167) (0.131) (0.132) (0.128) (0.152)
Baseline Covariates No Yes No Yes No Yes
Subdistrict Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 275 265 264 259 275 265
Mean Dep.Var. 0.75 0.76 0.85 0.85 0.15 0.15
R-squared 0.01 0.29 0.08 0.39 0.00 0.16
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. E denotes formal
electric connections within 100m of the household. Excluded instrument in columns (1) and (2) is fee100; in
columns (3) and (4), fee100. Columns (2) and (4) control for the total number of eligible neighbors within
100m. Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than
zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
Appendix - Multinomial Choice Round by Round (Ordered Probit)
Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
main
voucher 0.211 0.304** 0.299* 0.309*
(0.136) (0.147) (0.161) (0.173)
s100 0.330** 0.538*** 0.521*** 0.763***
(0.142) (0.161) (0.183) (0.204)
Fee -0.559* -0.623* -0.442 -0.530
(0.294) (0.328) (0.360) (0.386)
Fee100 -0.750** -1.477*** -1.341*** -1.865***
(0.374) (0.438) (0.486) (0.549)
cut1
Constant -0.557 -1.907*** -0.729* -2.887*** -1.176*** -3.050*** -1.062** -3.553***
(0.344) (0.508) (0.388) (0.586) (0.424) (0.638) (0.447) (0.710)
cut2
Constant -0.002 -1.354*** -0.411 -2.572*** -0.851** -2.729*** -0.787* -3.285***
(0.343) (0.506) (0.387) (0.584) (0.422) (0.636) (0.446) (0.707)
Observations 414 414 422 422 446 446 432 432
Notes: The dependent variable in all cases is an indicator of formal connection to the grid. E denotes formal
electric connections within 100m of the household. Excluded instrument in columns (1) and (2) is fee100; in
columns (3) and (4), fee100. Columns (2) and (4) control for the total number of eligible neighbors within
100m. Standard errors clustered at the household level, reported in parentheses. Significantly different than
zero at 90(∗), 95(∗∗), and 99(∗∗∗) percent confidence. Source: Household Electrification Survey
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